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Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance 
Ying Li 
Previous studies of ownership structure mainly focus on the relationship between insider 
ownership and corporate performance. However, empirical results have failed to provide 
consistent evidence to prove whether the type of ownership does significant affect firm 
performance. Our paper fills this gap by classifying different types of shareholders 
(individual shareholders and institutional shareholders) and observes their relationship 
with corporate value respectively.  In addition, we examine quarterly panel data and 
indirect ownership to address the problem of endogeneity argued Demetz (2001).  
Our results show that only institutional ownership has consistent and significant 
relationship with firm value in both yearly regressions and panel data regression, while 
the relationship between individual ownership and firm value is not significant. 
Institutional ownership first decreases then increases firm value as institutional 
shareholders hold higher stakes in the firm. However, the effect of institutional ownership 
is counteracted when individuals have unexpectedly high levels of ownership. We also 
find that if institutional shareholders acquire more shares during a quarter, the change in 
firm value during this period is positive. Our results support the hypothesis that firm 
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It is well understood that ownership structure has important implications for corporate 
governance and performance. As early as 1932, Berle and Means studied the conflict 
between managers and shareholders. They argue that outside shareholders are too diffuse 
to monitor managers, and thus corporate resources are often used to satisfy managers’ 
self-interest rather than to maximize shareholder wealth. One solution to this problem is 
to give managers equity compensation in the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose 
the concept of associating ownership and control to agency costs, and that agency costs 
can be mitigated by balancing managerial ownership and outsider ownership.  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the costs of deviation from value-
maximization decline as managerial ownership rises, which is convergence-of-interest 
hypothesis. However, Morck et al. (1988), McConnell (1990), and Stulz (1988) point out 
that there exists a level of insider ownership which can maximize the value of a firm. In 
other words, the positive effect of managerial ownership on corporate value will be wiped 
out as more ownership is concentrated in managers’ hands because they have high 
enough voting power to influence corporate policy and decision that benefit themselves, 
which is entrenchment hypothesis [Morck et al. (1988)].  
McConnell (1990) uses the sample of 1,173 firms for 1976 and 1,093 firms for 1986 and 
find that managerial ownership improves firm value until it reaches approximately 40% 
to 50% and then slopes slightly downward. Morck et al. (1988) find the similar result, 
where they apply piecewise linear regression and find the break point of managerial 
ownership at 5%, where managerial ownership is negatively related to firm value after 
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that. These studies are criticized by Demsetz (2001), and Himmelberg et al. (1999), 
where they argue that the ownership structure of a corporation should be thought of as an 
endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders and of trading 
on the market for shares. And both Demsetz (2001), and Himmelberg et al. (1999) find 
no significant relationship of insider ownership and corporate value. 
While considerable work focuses on the relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance, few studies, so far, discuss whether the type of ownership significantly 
affects firm performance. Institutional shareholders, most of which are blockholders, are 
always seeking investment opportunities and have professional insight. Compared with 
other outside shareholders, they are more likely to have bargaining power against 
management team and play an active role in monitoring the corporation. 
Pound (1988), in contrast, presents two hypotheses considering institutional shareholders’ 
possible negative contribution to firm performance through conflict-of-interest behavior 
and Strategic-alliance behavior. He suggests that institutional investors pose their own 
incentive conflicts and thus deviate from the interest of other shareholders. They also 
harm the corporation if they are less willing to challenge the management team in order 
to maintain business relationships with the firm.   
The empirical results for the effect of institutional ownership are mixed. The cost-
effective monitoring hypothesis is supported by McConnell (1990) and Hand and Suk 
(1998). McConnell (1990) includes total institutional shareholders share ratio in the 
ownership-firm value regression and reports a significant positive relationship with firms’ 
Tobin Q. Hand and Suk (1998) use the geometric average return for a five-year period 
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(1988-1992) to proxy for firm performance and find that the geometric average return is 
positively related to institutional ownership. However, they cannot conclude a long-term 
positive effect of institutional ownership on corporate value as they only test the cross-
sectional effect. They also ignore the fact that substantially higher concentration of 
institutional ownership may lead to conflict-of-interest and strategic-alliance with 
management team. 
Few studies have considered the negative effect institutional shareholders may have on 
the corporation. Chen and Blenman (2008), Iturriaga and Crisotomo (2010) have tested 
both the efficient-monitoring and conflict-of-interest effects by including a quadratic term 
in the model and find a nonlinear relationship of ownership concentration in institutional 
shareholders and firm value. However, they only consider the top institutional 
shareholder ownership, rather than using total institutional shareholders’ equity. This 
limitation can result from ignoring the possible effect imposed by multiple institutional 
shareholders on corporate performance. 
In this paper, our first goal is to reexamine the theoretical explanations of the link 
between managerial ownership and firm performance proposed by McConnell (1990). 
We use the direct ownership sample of firms in June 2003 and June 2005. Consistent 
with McConnell (1990), our results show that individual ownership first increases firm 
value then decrease firm value after certain level of ownership is concentrated in 
individual shareholders. We also modify their model by including the quadratic term of 
institutional ownership in the model to examine the possible negative effect of 
institutional ownership. The effect of institutional ownership is significant and is found to 
be first negatively then positively related to firm value after reaching a threshold. 
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The second goal of this paper is to propose an equilibrium interpretation of individual 
ownership effect and institutional ownership effect on company performance. We 
examine an indirect ownership sample from 2004 to 2010 and try to mitigate the problem 
of endogeneity argued by Demsetz (2001). We also apply panel data regression instead of 
cross-sectional regression to control for any constant and unobservable heterogeneity, 
which cannot be accurately estimated using OLS.  
The indirect ownership, unlike direct ownership, will not be directly affected by the 
variables that influence the firm. We define indirect ownership if firm A indirectly owns 
firm C through other direct investment in firm B. Indirect institutional ownership still 
presents the convex effect on firm value as it does in direct institutional ownership; while 
indirect individual ownership no longer significantly relates to corporation value when 
we pool all the quarterly data together. However, the effect of institutional ownership is 
counteracted when individuals hold unexpectedly high level of ownership.  
The categories of institutional investors and families (individuals) investors and whether 
the firm is individual-owned or institutional-owned have not been widely explored by the 
current literature. The inclusion of these variables in the model provides us a new picture 
of how institutional equity and individual equity affect corporate value under certain 
circumstances. We find that, generally, firm value is higher when it is institutional-owned.
5 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Insider Ownership 
Agency problems arise from the inherent conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders. Managers attempt to pursue the personal interest and goals at the expense 
of corporate shareholders, thereby maximizing their own utility rather than maximizing 
shareholder wealth. They may even forgo projects and other decisions that benefit the 
corporation, thereby decreasing firm value [Berle and Means (1932)]. 
The concept of associating ownership and control to agency costs is suggested by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). A wholly owned firm is operated to maximize owner’s pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary benefits, which includes profits made from operating the firm, and 
other utility generated by entrepreneurial activities. If the owner only owns a fraction of 
the firm, he will maximize his utility potentially at a cost to other shareholders. Because 
in this case, the firm value reduction due to the manager satisfying his self-interest is less 
than the benefits he could get from expropriating firm resources. As the managerial 
equity declines, the degree to which a manager can expropriate company resources 
increases. It is worth noting, however, that as minority shareholders own more shares, 
they are more willing to spend resources to monitor managerial behavior. Overall, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) proposed a theory balancing managerial and outsider ownership to 
mitigate the agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control.  
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), many papers have developed models of insider 
ownership on corporate value. Most studies discuss how the level of insider ownership 
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affects manager’s decision making and thus influence the degree of managerial effort to 
maximize shareholders’ benefits and corporate performance.  
One of these influences can be found in takeover event, when the conflict between 
managers and outside shareholders is obviously intensified. Managers attempt to control 
voting rights because they can affect the behavior of potential bidders and hence the 
probability of losing control [Stulz (1988)].  When managers have a substantial fraction 
of ownership, it harms the outside shareholders’ benefits because the tender offer is 
always opposed by managers in order to maintain control; however, if managers have no 
shares of the company, a tender offer can succeed, but the premium offered by the bidder 
is less than the maximum that the bidder is willing to pay. Therefore, consistent with 
Jensen and Meckling (1967), Stulz points out that there exists a level of insider 
ownership which can maximize the value of firm. However, Stulz assumes that the 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers arises only from the fact that a 
successful takeover always benefits shareholders but hurt managers, which is limited. In 
addition he also ignores the positive effect of large managerial ownership on firm value 
as stressed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) conduct an empirical test of the managerial 
ownership-firm value relationship. Unlike Stulz (1988), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) take into account different level of insider ownership by artificially setting three 
ranges of managerial ownership: Low level of 0%-5%, Medium level of 25%-50% and 
significantly high level of over 50%. The results report a positive relation between 
ownership and Tobin Q in the range of 0% to 5% ownership, then a negative relation 
between 5% to 25%, and a further positive relation beyond 25%. They apply the 
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convergence-of-interests hypothesis and entrenchment hypothesis to extend the theory of 
ownership structure of Jensen and Meckling (1976). When insider ownership is at a very 
low level, increasing the ownership of management can align managers’ interests with 
shareholders’ interest. As managers own more and more shares, it’s possible that they 
expropriate corporate resources; however, the decrease or increase in firm value depends 
on which effect, convergence-of-interests or entrenchment, dominates after 25% 
managerial ownership. The limitation of this paper is the small sample size, using only 
371 Fortune 500 firms in 1980 and the artificial breakpoints of ownership. 
Compared to Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), McConell (1990) investigates the 
relation of ownership structure and corporate value in a more flexible way. Instead of 
piecewise regression, nonlinear regression is applied to capture the effect of ownership 
on corporate value changes along the level of ownership. The result is similar to Stulz 
(1988), they find a curvilinear relation and that managers could maximize the corporate 
value when almost 50% of the shares are concentrated in their hands, with the inflection 
point between 40% and 50%. Then McConnell et al.(2008) examine the impact of 
ownership structure by observing the relation between changes in ownership and changes 
in stock prices within the 6-day interval after the announcement of share purchases by 
insiders. Still consistent with many previous studies, they find a positive relation when 
managers hold small fraction of shares as evidence of incentive alignment, and negative 




2.2. Other Blockholder Ownership 
The literature focusing on insider or managerial ownership, in general, assumes that the 
management team has relatively strong power and freedom in using firm’s resources and 
in influencing policy. Large numbers of shareholders are diffused and these small 
investors have little incentive to monitor management; as the cost for them to monitor 
managerial performance outweighs the benefits they could get from increased firm value. 
Giving the increasingly active participation in firm management by different types of 
shareholders these days, recent literature has extended the area of insider or managerial 
ownership to include large shareholders ownership [Thomsen and Pedersen (2000)]. 
While most outside shareholders cannot exercise real power to oversee managerial 
performance in modern corporation[Demsetz and Lehn (1985)], they still can discipline 
managers’ behavior in other ways. Edmans and Manso (2011) argue that blockholders are 
able to lead managers to act in line with other shareholders’ interest. 
A blockholder is defined as a shareholder with an exceptionally large amount or value of 
stock. There’s still no strict definition of how many shares should be defined as a block, 
however it’s often used for holdings of more than 10,000 shares or shares worth more 
than $200,000. Blockholders with high concentrated ownership have more power and 
have sufficient incentives to bear the cost of monitoring, and if necessary, to intervene to 
correct value-destructive actions.   
Edmans and Manso (2011) suggest that blockholders govern management team in a 
corporation through trading and intervention. Once the large shareholders find evidence 
of manager shirking and perquisite-taking, they can sell their shares to other traders and 
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drive down the stock price, thereby reducing the value of the manager’s equity 
compensation, and consequently forcing managers to take corrective actions to improve 
firm value. Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994), Chen, Harford and Li (2007), and 
Starks (2003) provide evidence of governance through trading. Alternatively, if several 
large blockholders have a high concentration of shares in their hands, they may have the 
voting rights and power needed to directly intervene in the management team.  
The effect of blockholder ownership has also studied in the takeover context, where it 
implies that block trades benefit both target and acquirer firms. [Mikkelson and Rudback 
(1985)] find positive abnormal returns associated with initial announcements when the 
target firm receives 5% or more investment prior a takeover. Barclay and Holderness 
(1990) report the similar results, where they find positive excess returns around 
announcement date when outsiders acquire large equity positions and they also find the 
stock-price increases are larger as control passes to new blockholders when management 
does not resist the blockholder’s effort to influence corporate policy. 
Prior literature has shown that large shareholders improve firm’s market performance, 
because compared to small shareholders; they monitor and control managers to act in the 
interest of outside shareholders. However, whether the positive effect is consistent for all 
levels of large shareholder ownership still needs discussion. La Porta et al. (1997) argue 
that the influence of ownership structure depends on the institutional and legal setting. 
Minority shareholders’ benefits may not be protected if ownership is too concentrated in 
the hands of several large blockholders.  
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This theory is derived from Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the combination of 
alignment and entrenchment effect [Morck et al. (1988)] still can be applied to analyzing 
the effect of blockholders and institutional investors. When large shareholders do not 
have a high enough percentage of shares, they cannot extract private benefits and would 
like to co-operate with other shareholders to discipline management team; however, the 
possibility of entrenchment arises after the threshold of ownership is reached, and they 
can now pursue their self-interest at the cost of minority shareholders. And thus Iturriaga 
and Crisotomo (2010) test the effect of blockholder ownership on corporate value with 
sample of Brazilian companies where ownership concentration is measured as the 
percentage of ownership owned by the largest shareholder. The results support the theory 
discussed above: blockholders’ ownership structure has a nonlinear effect. Ownership 
concentration initially improves the value of firm; but after a certain threshold, firm value 
decreases as the risk that large shareholders will expropriate corporate wealth increases. 
2.3. Institutional Shareholders 
In North America most of the blockholders are institutional investors, which have large 
funds and expertise and are always seeking investment opportunities. The Federal 
Reserve Financial Economists Roundtable (1998) concludes that increased institutional 
ownership can benefit corporate governance and mitigate the conflict of interest arising 
from separation of ownership and control. They summarize three positive advantages: 1. 
Institutional owners with higher ownership concentration are able to perform oversight 
activities applying their professional insight; 2. They monitor management behavior and 
decisions and mitigate the conflict of management and other owners at a lower cost than 
minority shareholders; 3. Institutional investors, after owning a large shares of company, 
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find it more costly to sell their position than to intervene if they feel the managers are not 
maximizing shareholder value. 
Apart from the advantages of increasing institutional ownership, Pound (1988) presents 
two hypotheses against the efficient-monitoring theory. According to the strategic-
alliances hypothesis, institutional investors feel that they benefit more if they align their 
interests with the incumbent management than if they compete with the management 
team. The conflict-of-interest hypothesis suggests that institutional investors are inclined 
to vote for management because they have certain business relationship with the 
company and voting against management may lead to a detriment of this relationship. 
The second hypothesis is supported by Cornett et al. (2004), where he shows that in order 
to obtain new or maintain existing business relationships with firms, institutional 
investors are less willing to challenge management decisions. 
Many empirical tests have been carried out to verify the different hypotheses and theory 
about whether an increase in institutional ownership can benefit or harm firms. 
McConnell (1990) includes total institutional shareholders share ratio in the ownership-
firm value regression and reports a significant positive relationship with firms’ Tobin Q, 
which is contrary to Pound (1988). Other literature, including Clay (2001) and Hand and 
Suk (1998), also find a positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
value, which further suggests that such a relationship reveals efficient monitoring by 
institutional investors. Clay (2001) examines the 8,951 firms between 1988 and 1999 and 
finds significant results not only in the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model but also in a 
Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) model. Hand and Suk (1998), instead of using Tobin Q 
to measure corporate value, use the geometric average return for a five-year period 
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(1988-1992) to proxy for firm performance. However, both McConnell (1990) and Clay 
(2001) cannot conclude the long-term positive effect of institutional ownership on 
improving corporate performance as they only test the cross-sectional effect. The 
limitation in most of the literature also arises because they ignore the negative effect that 
higher concentration of large shareholders ownership might impose on firm. 
Considering the possibility that the manager of a top institution seeks to establish a 
special relationship with the management in the invested firm thereby harming firm 
performance, Chen and Blenman (2008) hypothesize that the top ownership is negatively 
related to firm value. However, multiple institutional shareholders could benefit the firm 
because they can monitor each other to prevent the possibility that one of them 
expropriates firm resources at a cost to others, and also they can monitor managerial 
behavior more efficiently since they have enough power to influence managerial behavior 
and force them to act in the interest of shareholders. In their test, Chen and Blenman 
(2008) use two institutional ownership variables; the percentage of shares owned by the 
largest institutional investor, and the total of top 5 institution’s share ratio. The results 
indicate that while a dominant institution might hurt firm value, the concentration of 
ownership of the top 5 institutions is positively related to Tobin Q. Chen and Blenman 
(2008) use a sample of firms from 2000-2003 but they didn’t address the autoregressive 
problem in panel data regression. However, they run yearly regression and find that all 
significant variables in the yearly results have the same sign in the all-years results. 
Iturriaga and Crisotomo (2010) take into account both the efficient-monitoring and 
conflict-of-interest effect of institutional ownership by including quadratic term in the 
model. Same as Chen and Blenman (2008), Iturriaga and Crisotomo (2010) use the 
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proportion of shares owned by the largest shareholder to measure ownership 
concentration and square it to test a possible nonlinear relationship of ownership 
concentration. The results confirms this curvilinear effect: increasing largest ownership 
benefits the firm value, but this effect level off when largest shareholder owns high 
enough shares in a firm and they extract benefits to the detriment of small shareholders. 
The result is partially consistent with Chen and Blenman (2008) on the negative effect of 
largest shareholders.    
However, there are studies that appear to challenge the significant role that institutional 
ownership plays in invested firms. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991), Lowenstein (1991) 
and Charfeddine and Elmarzougui (2010) find little evidence that institutional ownership 
is related with firm performance.  
All in all, tests on ownership – performance types typically are done on ownership 
concentration [starting from Berle and Means (1932)]. Normally, blockholder ownership 
concentration is measured either by the largest shareholder’s stockholding [Iturriaga and 
Crisotomo (2010)] or by the top five shareholders’ equity [Chen and Blenman (2008), 
Cornett et al. (2004)]. Insider ownership is measured by the total share ratio owned by 
managers and executives in the firm [McConnell (1990), Morck et al. (1988)].  
The two relationships, insider ownership via corporate performance, and institutional 
ownership via corporate performance, have been broadly explored in many papers; 
however, the results are mixed. Besides, scholars tend to examine these two relationships 
separately. Even though McConnell (1990) includes institutional ownership into the 
regression of insider ownership on corporate value and finds a positive impact of 
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institutional shareholders, they tend to ignore the negative effect imposed by the 
blockholders with sufficiently high shares ratio. According to the conflict-of-interest and 
efficient-monitoring hypotheses, it’s believed that blockholder ownership, institutional 
ownership and insider ownership can interact together to influence corporate value and 
it’s worth studying mutual effect of these ownership. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) 
also cast doubt on whether the stock holding of family owners and corporate executives 
modify the relationship between institutional shareholdings and firm performance.  
While a considerable body of research analyzing ownership structure has focused on 
insider ownership and blockholder ownership, less literature has paid attention to 
blockholder identity. It’s important to note that the identity of owners has implications for 
their objectives and the way they exercise their power; this is reflected in company 
strategy with regard to profit goals, dividends, capital structure and growth rates 
[Thomsen and Pedersen (2000)].   
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3. Research Design and Hypotheses Development 
The generally accepted view in the literature is that insider ownership has two opposite 
effects on corporate performance depending on the level of share holding that managers 
own [Jensen and Meckling (1976), Morck et al. (1988) and Stulz (1988)]. Following their 
theory, we propose a ―concave‖ relationship between insider ownership and corporate 
performance. When managers own a small fraction of shares, increasing their 
shareholdings helps mitigate conflict of interests and give managers an incentive to act in 
line with shareholders’ interests; in contract, when they have a high level of ownership, 
managers have more freedom and power to influence the corporation and can satisfy their 
self-interest without being sufficiently monitored by outside shareholders.  
We also test the effect of institutional ownership on corporate performance. As suggested 
by Pound (1988), we consider the types of incentives confronted by institutional investors: 
efficient-monitoring, strategic-alliances, and conflict-of-interest. These incentives are 
expected to exist at all levels of institutional ownership and the effects of these incentives 
will ―compete‖ and determine which effect dominates at certain levels of ownership. Our 
hypothesis is that increasing institutional share holding first decreases firm value because 
institutional shareholders follow the ―exit policy‖ when they disagree with management 
or when they sell the shares just for capital earning [Coffee (1991)]. Sometimes, 
institutional shareholders may even become involved in strategic-alliance with the 
management team and thus expropriate corporate resources at the expense of other 
shareholders, thereby harming firm value. However, sufficiently high ownership 
concentration makes them tightly connect to the corporation and more costly to sell their 
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shares due to the liquidity impact of selling a large stake. Normally, these institutional 
shareholders can be regarded as long-term strategic investors, and they have a motive to 
govern managers and vote for any decision that benefits outside shareholders. 
However, it’s argued that the relation between ownership structure and corporate value is 
spurious because of the potential endogeneity which arises when external pressures push 
firms toward optimal ownership structures that jointly optimize over ownership and value 
[Demsetz (2001)]. According to his point, the ownership structure of a corporation is an 
endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders and of trading 
on the market for shares. In an effort to address this alleged endogeneity problem, we 
investigate the indirect share holding of individual and institutional investors. We define 
indirect ownership if firm A indirectly owns firm C through other direct investment in 
firm B. Following example shows firm A indirectly owns firm C: 
 
Figure 1 Indirect Ownership of Entity A in Entity B 
The reason we use indirect ownership to mitigate the endogeneity problem is that the 
ownership structure of company C will not be directly affected by firm A and firm A’s 
investment will not be directly influenced by company C’s characters. However, firm A 
will still have an indirect effect on firm C through the holding and voting power in firm B. 
If firm A owns a high enough percentage of shares in firm B, it has right to govern firm 
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B’s investment decisions and policy. Suppose that management team in firm B, under the 
governance of firm A, takes right action to maximize shareholders’ value, firm B should 
play an active role in monitoring firm C in order to satisfy its shareholders (including 
firm A). Therefore, we can say that the effect of A’s ownership in B can be transferred to 
C, and the theory of efficient-monitoring and conflict-of interest can still be applied to 
indirectly ownership.  
We test the effect of indirect institutional ownership versus individual ownership. For 
indirect institutional ownership, we still hypothesize a non-linear effect on corporate 
value as we suggested that the effect of efficient-monitoring and conflict-of interest can 
be transferred through indirect shareholding. Similar to direct ownership, we expect a 
negative relationship between indirect institutional ownership and corporate value when 
ownership concentration is at a low level; a positive relationship after reaching a 
threshold of ownership. For indirect individual ownership, which includes both outside 
individual shareholders and managers, we still hypothesize the concave effect of 
individual ownership. But we expect that the effect might be mixed because we measure 
the individual ownership as the shares owned by normal families (or individuals) and 
managers. In comparison to institutional investors who have expertise and prudence in 
managing funds and whose investment is part of a much larger portfolio, individual 
investors may have very different levels of expertise and risk aversion. 
Unlike cross-sectional studies, we combine cross-sectional information with times series 
to build a panel with 18,876 firm-quarter observations, which provides more efficient 
estimations. In addition, we use quarterly data instead of annual data to track the impact 
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of changes in ownership on changes in corporate value. We expect that change of 
institutional holding has a positive relationship on corporate value. 
We also investigate the interaction between institutional ownership and individual 
ownership, since no studies has been done to explore this area. Giving the hypotheses we 
mentioned above, institutional ownership and individual ownership have completely 
opposite effects on corporate value, one with convex effect and the one with concave 
effect. We don’t expect that institutional ownership and individual ownership to be 
independent. In contrast, we would expect to find a negative relationship; firms with very 
high levels of individual ownership are more likely to have low levels of institutional 
ownership. Therefore, if we plan to include both institutional and individual equity into 
one regression, the problem of collinearity may arise and cause estimation error of 
variables. In order to resolve this problem, rather than using individual holding, we 
include unexpected individual holding in the regression. We then test the interacted effect 
of unexpected individual ownership and institutional ownership on corporate 
performance. We also test the impact on corporate value imposed by the fact that whether 
individual ownership is higher than we expect. We expect that when individuals hold 
unexpectedly high levels of ownership, it may counteract the role of the institutional 
shareholders. 
In our paper, we also focus on the categories of institutional investors and families 
(individuals) investors because of the large distinction in investment behavior between 
them. In the case of individual-owned companies, financial problems due to capital 
rationing, short-time horizons and risk aversion are particularly likely to influence the 
company [Fama and Jensen, (1985)]. Contrary to individual-owned companies, 
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institutional-owned companies have low risk aversion and a relatively long-time 
investment horizon. Therefore, in the test including the investors’ identity, we include a 
dummy variable if largest shareholder is an institutional investor or an individual investor. 





4. Data Collection 
The ownership data used in this paper is from OSIRIS, which is a fully integrated public 
company database and analytical information solution produced by Bureau van Dijk 
Electronic Publishing, SA (BvD). OSIRIS provides financials, ownership, news, ratings, 
earnings and stock data for the publicly quoted companies in over 120 countries. All 
financial information is released by quarter and complemented with data from the 
following sources:  
 Bureau van Dijk—Ownership Database  
 Edgar Online —SEC Filings 
 Dow Jones—Dow Jones Global Indexes 
 Finifo—Stock data 
 Fitch Ratings—Ratings 
 JCF Group—Earnings Estimates 
 Moody’s—Ratings 
 Standard and Poor’s—Ratings 
 Reuters—News 
Specially, ownership and shareholder information in OSIRIS comes from Edgar online 
and Bureau van Dijk (BVD). Edgar online provides filings from US SEC going back as 
far as 1999 to OSIRS. The Bureau van Dijk ownership research team primarily collects 
ownership information from annual reports and regulatory statements, direct contact with 
concerned institutions, press and additional published sources. In addition, Bureau van 
Dijk constantly monitors company websites to retrieve reports and collects US SEC 
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filings for updating to ensure highest quality of data [BvDEP Ownership Database 
(2008)].According to the newest version of OSIRIS instruction, its database has covered 
over 30,000 worldwide companies, 19,198 of them contain at least one shareholder. 
We choose US firms and filter the ones that are in ―Active‖ status, ruling out the ones 
that are active but no longer with accounts on OSIRIS, bankruptcy, in liquidation and 
inactive.
1
These firms are further screened out from which are traded in main stock 
exchange(s) and are listed. The reason that we choose active firms with their shares 
traded in secondary market is that it provides us a more accurate picture of relationship 
between ownership structure and firm value.  
In our test, we use quarterly data on ownership, including shareholder direct ownership 
and indirect ownership, types of shareholder. We focus on direct ownership using only 
June 2003 and June 2005 to maintain comparatively to McConnell (1990);
2
indirect 
ownership using panel data from March 2004 to June 2010. The advantage of quarterly 
data versus annual data is that ownership structure can change several times in a year as 
long as there are share-purchase announcements. Therefore, quarterly data captures the 
change of ownership by updating ownership information in a short time, which helps us 
to observe the effect of ownership structure more accurately than using annual data. 
As OSIRIS indentifies each entity with International Securities Identification number 
(ISIN), it needs to be transferred to NCUSIP in order to merge with Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP).  ISIN uniquely identifies a security and it is a 12-character 
                                               
1 As we are downloading data from each quarterly update of Osiris, we are, in effect, only requiring that a 
firm be ―active‖ for that one quarter to be included in the sample. 
2 From April 2003, SEC mandates electronic filing of ownership reports filed by officers, directors and 
principle security holders. This will result in earlier public notification of insiders’ transaction and wider 
public availability of information about those transactions. 
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alpha-numerical code consisting of three parts: a two-letter country code, a nine-character 
national security identifier, and a single check digit. The nine-digit numeric part is the 
main body of ISIN, representing the original CUSIP, which is also named NCUSIP.   
OSIRIS data are then merged with Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
monthly data base using NCUSIP. From CRSP, we get the PERMNO for each firm, 
company closing prices and number of shares outstanding corresponding to the quarterly 
data in OSIRIS. According to CRSP, negative sign is designated to price indicating that it 
is a bid/ask average when the closing price is not available on trading day. We assume 
that the negative-signed price is the closing price of that company and make it an 
absolute value. Companies with zero- price are deleted from the sample.  
In order to merge with COMPUSTAT, where GVKEY is the main identifier, we use the 
CRSP-COMPUSTAT linking table to find out GVKEY for each PERMNO. After getting 
GVKEY for sample firms in OSIRIS-CRSP data, we merge it with COMPUSTAT to 
obtain other control variables by quarters: Total Liabilities, Current Liabilities, Long-
Term Debt, Current Assets, Net Income, and Total Assets. Firms missing valid value in 
these variables are deleted from sample. Table 1 summarizes the number of firms in each 
quarter as we merge OSIRIS with CRSP, then with COMPUSTAT.  
4.1. Direct Ownership and Indirect Ownership 
Ownership provided in OSIRIS comes from SEC filings and Bureau van Dijk ownership 
database. In order to check whether the direct ownership in OSIRIS is consistent with 
ownership information in SEC filings, we randomly check 50 firms on Edgar online by 
searching the form of DEF 14A, which is Definitive Proxy Statement, and 13D. Direct 
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ownership of insider shareholder and outside investors in OSIRIS shows approximately 
same percentage of interest shown in DEF 14A. The small difference may caused by 
several reasons: 1) DEF 14A does not report exact number of shares ratio owned by 
insider shareholders with less than 1% ownership; 2) DEF 14A does not include outsider 
shareholders with shareholdings less than 5%; 3) DEF 14A includes stock options, 
however, it is unknown whether OSIRIS take the options into considerations; 4) DEF 
14A combines direct beneficial ownership and indirect beneficial ownership together and 
shows it as beneficial ownership, while OSIRIS reports direct ownership and total 
ownership (sum of direct and indirect ownership) separately.  
In OSIRIS, direct ownership indicates that entity A owns a certain percentage of 
Company C. For conducting the test of direct ownership sample, we can simply use this 
direct ownership data from OSIRIS. Where signs like ―+/-‖, ―>‖, or ―<‖can be found 
before the numeric value, we delete these firms because we are not sure the exact 
percentage of interest. These firms occupies roughly 0.8%-1.2% in each quarter. 
If one shareholder indirectly owns a stake in company, a sign of ―-‖ appears in direct 
ownership, but numeric value of ownership percentage appears in ―Total Ownership‖ 
column. According to OSIRIS, BvDEP makes the summation of the direct and indirect 
percentage and notes it as Total ownership. In this case, even though indirect figures are 
not recorded in the BvDEP ownership database, we can still infer indirect percentage 
through Total Ownership. In other words, Direct Ownership with missing number 
together with Total Ownership with numeric value implies that this shareholder holds 
indirect ownership in invested firm. In the cases where both Direct Ownership and Total 
Ownership have valid value, we infer indirect ownership as Total Ownership minus 
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Direct Ownership. Similar to Direct Ownership, we filter the firms with Total Ownership 
embracing the signs of ―+/-‖, ―>‖, or ―<‖. 
4.2. Types of Shareholders’ Equity 
Types of shareholders have been identified in OSIRIS since 2004. Based on our 
hypotheses and test, we classify four general types of shareholders: 
A. Institutional Shareholders 
Bank, financial company, insurance company, mutual & pension fund / Nominee / trust / 
trustee and private equity firms are classified as Institutional Shareholders. The reason we 
include them in this category is that these entities are expected to have expertise in 
managing funds and investment, which distinct from individual and family investment 
behavior.  
B. Individual or families 
OSIRIS already identifies the shareholder as individual or families. Besides single private 
individuals or family, shareholders designated by more than one named individual or 
families are included this category.  As suggested in OSIRIS, the idea behind this is that 
they would probably exert their voting power together.  
C. Industrial companies 
OSIRIS includes all companies that are not banks or financial companies nor insurance 
companies into this category. Industrial companies can be involved in manufacturing 
activities but also in trading activities (wholesalers, retailers, brokers, etc.) Industrial 
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companies, unlike institutional investors and individual investors, are expected to focus 
more on the vertical ties between them and invested firms. A large block acquired by an 
industrial company may imply either a business relationship or a potential future 
acquisition. 
D. Other types 
We classify the remained of shareholder types in OSIRIS as ―Others‖, which includes 
foundation/research institute, public authorities, self ownership, public and unnamed 
private shareholders. The investment behavior of this shareholder type is not obviousand 
the effect they have on corporate value is obscure. 
It is noted that OSIRIS does not provide types of shareholders in data prior year 2004; 
therefore, we manually check each shareholder through websites and designate the 
shareholder types for sample before 2004. 
4.3. Ownership Data Description 
After merging OSIRIS, CRSP and COMPUSTAT data together, we get two samples: one 
is a direct ownership sample using cross-sectional data in June 2003 and June 2005 
separately; the other is indirect ownership sample using panel data from March 2004 to 
June 2010. For direct ownership sample, each institutional investor owns an average of 
3.47% and 3.52% shares in the invested firms in June 2003 and June 2005 respectively; 
individual investor owns an average of 7.25% and 7.39% respectively; while industrial 
company owns an average of 11.28% and 11.51% respectively. 
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For the indirect ownership sample, we report the number of firms and summarize average 
indirect equity owned by each type of shareholders in Table 2. As we can see, from 
March 2004 to September 2005, institutional investor’s indirect equity is around 8.5% 
and every firm has an average of 1-2 institutional shareholders. However, average 
indirect equity owned by institutional shareholders decreases sharply after December 
2005 and further decreases to around1%- 1.3% since September 2007. The big difference 
mainly arises from the fact that the information sources used by BvDEP have changed 
over with time. Before December 2005, most of ownership information is from US SEC 
filings and NASDAQ website under the entry of ―Beneficial Owner‖. This procedure 
limits the records to mainly 5% or more ownership. From 2006, BvDEP has enlarged its 
information sources to company web-sites, Factset Research Systems and private 
correspondence. The broad range of sources makes BvDEP collect ownership even below 
5% and consequently, from September 2005, we find that average number of institutional 
investors within one firm has increased to 16 and further increases to 40 after 2007. 
Because more shareholders with lower than 5% equity are included in the ownership data, 
average institutional equity has been dragged down.  
The same situation is observed in the industrial company’s ownership: in the early years, 
average indirect ownership is 17%-20% and we find that there is, on average, zero 
industrial company shareholders in a firm. After 2006, as BvDEP collects more 
ownership data from other sources and includes ownership less than 5%, the average 
number of industrial company shareholders in one firm has increased to 2 or 3, and thus 
decreases the average indirect ownership to 1%-2%. In Table 3, it also shows that the 
median level of institutional ownership drops to 1.28% at the end of 2005 and further 
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decreases to around 0.48% after June 2006. The minimum value of institutional 
ownership confirms the fact that BvDEP includes ownership less than 5% and even 1% 
after 2006. 
However, indirect equity of individuals remains consistent for all quarters and years: 
individual shareholders own, on average, 11%-12% of the firm and average one 
individual shareholder per firm. This is because most of the individual ownership data 
comes from the proxy statement in the SEC filings and BvDEP keep this source as the 
main collection for individual shareholding. This is observed by the minimum value of 
individual ownership shown in Table 3, which, as expected, is always above 5%. 
4.4. Panel Data 
We use panel data to test the relationship between indirect ownership and corporate 
performance, and the relationship between the change of ownership and change of 
corporate performance. However, as the number of sample firms in each quarter varies 
dramatically between quarters so that calculating the change of ownership and of 
performance will lead to a very unbalanced panel. Moreover, we will be able to form a 
dynamic picture to observe the continuous effect of ownership structure. Given the 
reasons mentioned above, we choose the firms that survived all quarters, which forms a 





5.1. Ownership Structure 
We measure institutional ownership as the sum of the fraction of shares owned by all 
institutional shareholders, individual ownership as the sum of fraction of shares owned by 
all individuals or families, and industrial company ownership as the sum of fraction of 
shares owned by all industrial companies. The largest shareholder is defined as the 
shareholder that holds the most shares in one company. We adopt two dummy variables 
to identify the type of the largest shareholder: ―IND_MAX‖ equals 1 if the largest 
shareholder is an individual investor; ―IO_MAX‖ equals 1 if the largest shareholder is an 
institutional investor.  
5.2. Corporate Performance and Control Variables 
We measure corporate performance using Tobin’s Q, as widely used by most previous 
studies [McConnell (1990), Himmelberg (1999) and Morck(1988)]. By definition it is the 





where MVS= market value of all outstanding stock, MVD= market value of all debt, and 
RVA= replacement value of all production capacity. However, we use the version of 
Tobin Q developed by Wolfe and Sauaia (2005), where they modify the approximation of 
q by Chung and Pruitt (1994) and this modified version closely approximates Tobin’s 
original statistic and produces a 96.6% approximation of the original formulation used by 







where MVS= market value of all outstanding shares, firm’s stock price ×  shares 
outstanding; TA= firm’s total assets; D= debt defined as following: 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 = (𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) + 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
Several control variables are chosen for this study, including: a) firm size, measured as 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm size is used to account for the possibility that 
firm performance is related to the size of firm; b) financial leverage, measured as the ratio 
of debt to equity, is adopted to take into account the possible influence of firm’s capital 
structure on its investment decisions [Harris and Raviv, (1991)]; c) ROA, defined as 
return on assets, to measure the profitability of the company. 
5.3. Regression Model 
5.3.1. Cross-Sectional Regression 
We investigate the effect of ownership structure upon corporate performance by 
conducting two lines of study. Firstly, we run cross-sectional regression of Tobin’s Q on 
direct ownership as the preliminary test to see whether we can replicate the results of 
McConnell (1990), where they use annual data 1976 and 1986 while we use quarterly 
data June 2003 and June 2005. We also include institutional equity and squared equity in 
the model to test a possible curvilinear effect of institutional ownership. The equation (1) 
as follows is the cross-sectional test using ordinary least-squares analysis (OLS): 
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𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗
                        𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                  (1) 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2) 
where IND is the fraction of shares owned by individual shareholders, IO is the fraction 
of shares owned by institutional shareholders, LEV is leverage ratio, Size is firm size and 
ROA is return on assets. 𝑖 refers to the firm, and 𝑡 refers to time. 
Considering the collinearity problem arising from institutional shareholding and 
individual shareholding, we first run the regression of individual equity on institutional 
equity and take the residuals: 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                           (3) 
We regard the residuals of individual ownership as the unexpected individual equity 
which cannot be explained or perfectly predicted by institutional ownership. We adopt a 
dummy variable RES_IND as unexpected individual ownership: RES_IND=1 if 
unexpected individual ownership is larger than 0; RES_IND=0 if unexpected individual 
ownership is less than 0.  Interaction term of 𝐼𝑂 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐷(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) is contained in the 
model since we believe the effect of institutional ownership depends on the unexpected 
individual shareholding. Therefore, the following model tests the interaction effect of 
institutional ownership and individual ownership on firm value: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽4 ∗
                        𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽5 ∗  𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) 
2 + 𝛽 ∗
                       𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 +  𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                   (4) 
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5.3.2. Panel Data Regression 
Secondly, we run the panel data regression of indirect ownership on Tobin’s Q to extend 
existing models proposed by previous studies. We use indirect ownership to address the 
alleged problem of endogeneity [Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Himmelberg et al. 
(1999)], because the variables that affect firm value will not directly influence the 
indirect beneficial ownership. The application of panel data allows us to control for any 
constant and unobservable heterogeneity [Arellano (2003); Hsiao (2004)] as well as fixed 
effects where the specific features of each firm that remain fixed over time; OLS cannot 
achieve this since it assumes that the average values of the variables and the relationships 
between them are constant across all the cross-sectional units and over time. 
Therefore, we rewrite equation (1) and equation (2) by decomposing the error term 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 into an individual specific effect 𝜂𝑖𝑡 , and the ―remainder disturbance‖𝑣𝑖𝑡 , that varies 
over time and entities (capturing everything that is left unexplained about Tobin’s Q): 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡   (5) 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡         (6) 
In equation (5) and equation (6), IO and IND represent the indirect ownership owned by 
institutional shareholders and individual shareholders separately; Control Variables 
includes LEV, Size and ROA. As suggested by Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Iturriaga 
and Crisotomo (2010) that the unobserved heterogeneity is a ―firm-fixed effect‖ and 
under this assumption, the panel data model can be modified as follows using dummy 
variables [the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach]: 
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𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂1𝐷1𝑖 +
                        𝜂2𝐷2𝑖 + ⋯ +  𝜂𝑛𝐷𝑛𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                              (7) 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂1𝐷1𝑖 +  𝜂2𝐷2𝑖 + ⋯ +
                         𝜂𝑛𝐷𝑛𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                                    (8) 
In equation (7) and (8), the error term  𝜂𝑖captures all of the variables that affect 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑖𝑡  
cross-sectionally but do not vary over time. Dummy variables interacted with 𝜂𝑖  identify 
the firm-specific effect, where 𝐷1𝑖  is a dummy variable that takes the  value of 1 for all 
the observations on the first firm and zero otherwise, 𝐷2𝑖  is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for all the observations on the second firm and zero otherwise, and so on. 
Therefore, the firm-fixed effect model examines entity difference in intercepts, assuming 
the same slopes and constant variance across entities. We will see whether the panel data 
approach is really necessary by testing the hypothesis 𝐻0:  𝜂1 =  𝜂2 = ⋯ =  𝜂𝑛 . If this 
null is rejected, then it is not appropriate to impose the restriction that the intercepts are 
the same over cross-sectional units and a panel approach must be employed. 
The panel approach is also applied to equation (4), the regression testing for the 
interaction effect of unexpected individual ownership and institutional ownership, and is 
applied to following models for testing the relationship between the largest shareholder’s 
equity (with its identity, institutional or individual) and corporate performance:  
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗  𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑀𝐴𝑋(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽 ∗
                         𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                 (9) 
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𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∗  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝑋(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖𝑡  +
                       𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                           (10) 
IND_MAX is dummy variable which equals 1 if the identity of largest shareholder is 
individual and 0 other wise; IO_MAX is dummy variable which equals 1 if the identity of 
largest shareholder is institutional shareholder and 0 other wise. The interaction term 
(𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡) and ( 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) are used to detect whether the identity 
of largest shareholder (individual or institutional investor) influence the actual effect 
imposed by the ownership of the other side (institutional ownership or individual 
ownership). 
5.3.3. Change of Ownership and Change of Firm Value 
The regression of the change in firm value on change in ownership is conducted to 
observe the relationship between them in a more dynamic way for each firm. We measure 
changes in ownership and in value over the quarter. Therefore, the change in firm value is 
the difference between Tobin Q in quarter 𝑇 and Tobin Q in quarter  𝑇 − 1 . Change in 
ownership is the difference between ownership in quarter 𝑇  and Tobin Q in quarter 
 𝑇 − 1 . Dummy variable IO_POSITIVE takes value 1 if institutional shareholders 
increase their shareholding at quarter 𝑇; and value equals 0 if institutional shareholders 
decrease their shareholding at quarter 𝑇 . Panel data approach is applied to following 
model:                                                                                            
        ∆𝑄 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ∆𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑂_𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗  ∆𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑂_𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽 ∗
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                        (11)          
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5.3.4. Autocorrelation  
A common problem in the panel data regression is autocorrelation of residuals, which 
affects statistical inferences. For all the panel data regressions, we use the Durbin Watson 
test to detect the first-order autocorrelation problem and we also run the regression of 
residual against its lag one and lag two values: 𝜀𝑡 = 𝜌1𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝜌2𝜀𝑡−2 + 𝜏𝑡  to confirm that 
there is no second-order autocorrelation. 
To solve the first-order autocorrelation, we take the first difference.  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  




6. Empirical Result 
6.1. Direct Ownership 
Table 4 shows preliminary results examining the relationship between direct ownership 
and corporate value, in which Tobin Q is regressed against individual ownership (IND) 
and institutional investors’ ownership (IO) respectively. We use quarterly data in June 
2003 and June 2005. As is shown in Table 1 regressions (1) and (3), there is strong 
evidence of a concave relation between individual ownership and Tobin Q – firm value 
first increases, then decreases, as ownership concentration increases. Both individual 
ownership and its squared term are statistically significant at 1% level. This curvilinear 
relation between individual equity and corporate value is consistent with Stulz (1988) and 
McConnell (1990). 
Figure 1 provides us a clear vision of how the individual equity affects corporate value at 
different levels of ownership. The graph is drawn according to the regression results in 
Table 4, where control variables are taken at their mean value.  
For low levels of individual ownership, its positive effect on firm value dominates the 
negative effect. A 10% increase in individual shareholdings increases the firm value by 
about 2% in 2003 and by about 3.5% in 2005. Tobin Q is maximized at 0.55-0.6 when 
individuals own approximately 37% of firm shares. After individual equity reaches the 
threshold, it drives down the firm value by 3%-5% with a 10% increase in individual 
equity. Compared to 2003, 2005 shows a more significant negative effect of individual 
equity because the same percentage increase in individual ownership is associated with a 
sharper decrease in firm value. In addition, we find that the inflection point of individual 
36 
 
ownership is similar to the inflection point of insider ownership calculated in McConnell 
(1990), 37% versus 37.6%.  
Table 4 regressions (2) and (4) are the results of the regression of corporate value on 
institutional ownership. A convex relation is found between institutional ownership and 
corporate value. Both institutional ownership and its squared term are significant at the 1% 
level: firm value first decreases and then increases as institutional shareholders own 
larger fractions of firm shares. Figure 2 draws this relationship according to equation (2) 
and (4) in Table 4. Unlike individual ownership, the graph shows a more symmetric 
shape of institutional shareholding versus Tobin Q, with the inflection point at 50% in 
2003 and 53% in 2005, and the minimum value of firm at a Tobin Q of approximately 
0.48. At low levels of ownership, a 10% increase in institutional equity decreases firm 
value by 5%. After reaching its threshold, a 10% increase in institutional equity increases 
Tobin Q by approximately 4.5%.The effects of institutional shareholdings are similar in 
2003 and 2005, as we find that two lines of ownership basically coincide together. The 
result of convex relation is consistent with our hypothesis. At lower level of ownership, 
institutional investors actively trade shares for capital-gaining objective, which makes 
them follow ―exit policy‖ and thus decrease firm value when they sell their shares. But 
institutional shareholders are tightly connected to invested firm when they acquire a large 
fraction of shares, thus they become harder to exit by selling large stake of shares and 
become long-term focus, which makes them have motive to monitor govern management 
team and monitor the operation of the invested firm. 
We expect there to be a relationship between the level of institutional and individual 
ownership. Both types of investors may be attracted to similar good investment 
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opportunities (positive relationship) or institutions and individuals may dominate firms at 
different stage of their development (negative relationship). We run the regression of 
individual ownership against institutional ownership and the result confirms a negative 
relationship. Therefore, we take the residuals of this model and regard it as unexpected 
individual shareholding, which is not explained by institutional ownership. 
Table 5 shows the results of regression equations including institutional ownership and 
unexpected individual shareholding. Regressions (1) and (2) are for the subsample of 
June 2003 and June 2005. As we can see, institutional ownership and its squared term are 
still significant at 1% level. The results indicate that institutional ownership still 
negatively relates to corporate value at low levels and then positively relates to it after 
ownership reaches high level, even when we include the unexpected individual 
ownership into model. Both 2003 and 2005 have similar coefficients of level of 
institutional ownership and its squared terms.  
When we look at the relationship between corporate value and unexpected individual 
shareholding, the coefficient of unexpected individual shareholding is positive, although 
in 2003 the coefficient is not significant at 10% level; and the coefficient of its squared 
term is significantly negative in both 2003 and 2005. This result indicates that when 
unexpected individual ownership is at low level, especially when negative, an increase in 
it may have positive influence on corporate value; if unexpected individual ownership is 
at high level, especially when positive, an increase in it will lead to decrease in firm value. 
The effect of unexpected individual shareholding has a similar pattern to that of 
individual shareholding. It makes sense because when more-than-expected shares are 
concentrated in individual shareholders’ hands, it implies that one or several individual 
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investors hold substantially high level of ownership, which means that they might 
expropriate firm resources to maximize their own utility and cause conflict of interest.  
The combined effect of institutional ownership and unexpected individual ownership is 
illustrated in Figure 3 for 2003 and Figure 4 for 2005.Institutional ownership and 
corporate value comprise a convex relationship with the inflection point still around 50%. 
However, the introduction of variable ―unexpected individual ownership‖ (RES_IND) 
changes the effect of institutional equity on corporate value. For example, the firm value 
based on the standard point of 20% institutional ownership and (-20%) RES_IND is 0.5. 
If RES_IND increases to positive 10%, then firm value with same institutional ownership 
increases to about 0.6, because RES_IND is still in the lower range and it positively 
affects firm value; if RES_IND increase to extremely high level, say 90%, the firm value 
with same institutional ownership decreases to 0.35-0.4, because RES_IND is in the high 
range and it now negatively affects firm value.  
6.2. Indirect Ownership 
Indirect ownership is examined to address the alleged spurious relationship with 
corporate value caused by the potential endogeneity problem. We replicate the 
regressions of firm value on indirect individual ownership and indirect institutional 
ownership respectively and run it annually to examine that whether our results are still 
consistent with the results we get from direct ownership.  
Table 6 shows the results of seven yearly regressions and a pooled sample regression for 
indirect individual ownership. A panel data approach is applied to control for any 
unobservable heterogeneity and firm fixed effects. We perform redundant fixed effect test 
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(EViews 6 User’s Guide, p672) to check that whether it is necessary to use the fixed-
effect panel data approach. In addition, we find the evidence of first-order autocorrelation 
of residuals but not of second-order autocorrelation, therefore, we add AR (1) term into 
the model to adjust the autocorrelation problem.  
We observe mixed effects of individual ownership, either concave or convex, in these 7 
years [Table 6 column (2) to column (8)].Thus we cannot generalize its effect on 
corporate performance. However, the results still support our hypothesis: unlike direct 
individual ownership which is primarily owned by managers and executives of the firm, 
indirect individual ownership is held by both normal individuals (outsider) and corporate 
managers (insider). Their investment objectives, power over corporate policy and the 
conflict-of-interest that exists between them, make their effects on corporate performance 
different. For example, when insiders hold a large fraction of shares in company, there 
are chances that they will use corporate resources to satisfy their self-interest. But 
outsiders may play a role in monitoring firm management team if they own a large 
fraction of the firms. The effect of individual ownership depends on how these two forces 
compete with each other and depends on which force dominates the other. 
Regression (1) in Table 6 indicates an insignificant relationship between individual 
ownership and corporate performance. The results further support the findings from 
yearly regressions. Individual ownership imposes a mixed influence on corporate value 
over time, and of course when we pool all the data together, we cannot conclude a 
consistent effect of individual shareholding. Another reason for their insignificant 
relationship is that individuals may lack professional knowledge and the funds needed to 
make a significant investment in the firm. In the long run, individual investors of firm B 
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may not have much power and time to influence firm C’s (owned by firm B) performance 
and operating decisions.   
For institutional ownership, a convex relation with corporate value is basically consistent 
over years. Table 7 gives the results for every year and pooled data and the inflection 
point is also calculated. Although in 2006, 2008 and 2009, there are no inflection points 
and the model shows a linear positive relationship, it still consistent with the theory and 
results of previous studies, which have showed that institutional ownership is positively 
related to corporate performance [McConnell (1990), Clay (2001), Hand and Suk (1998)].  
There is strong evidence to support our hypothesis that effect of indirect institutional 
equity on company B can be transferred to company C, which is owned by company B. 
We find significant coefficients of institutional equity and its squared terms in every year 
and even the pooled data regression. It can be explained by the fact that compared to 
individual investors, institutional investors are expert at managing funds and they have 
more bargaining power to influence the management team’s decision and firm policy, 
even if they just indirectly own the firm.  Therefore, institutional investors are more 
likely than individual investors to exert their effect of efficient-monitoring and conflict-
of-interest on indirectly owned companies. 
Given the situation that more institutional shareholders’ equity with less than 5% are 
included in ownership data since year 2006, we add a year dummy indicating the year 
after 2006 to take into account the possible increase in reported institutional ownership 
within one firm. We also include the interaction term of institutional equity and the year 
dummy in the model. We find that year dummy is significantly positively relative to 
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corporate value, while the interaction term is not significant. This implicates that year 
dummy only influences the intercept of regression but does not influence the relationship 
between institutional equity and firm value. 
Unexpected individual ownership is taken as the residual from the regression of 
individual ownership against institutional ownership. We do not report the regression that 
examines the level of unexpected individual ownership because its result is insignificant. 
However, we find that the sign of unexpected individual ownership does matter in 
influencing firm performance. Table 8 regression (1) reports the result which includes the 
interaction terms of  𝐼𝑂 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐷(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) and its squared term. Variable RES_IND 
(dummy) takes value 1 if unexpected individual ownership is larger than 0, meaning 
more shares are owned by individuals than we expect; and it takes 0 if unexpected 
individual ownership is less than 0.  
Institutional ownership still has a negative and then positive effect on corporate value. 
However, both the negative effect and positive effect are wiped out when unexpected 
individual holdings are positive. We interpret that the effect of institutional ownership 
will be counteracted by the existence of unexpected individual ownership. But 
institutional effect still dominates the individual equity effect.  
The test results for the identity of the largest shareholder are also provided in Table 8 
regressions (2) through regression (5), where IND_MAX equals 1 if the largest 
shareholder is an individual and IO_MAX equals 1 if the largest shareholder is an 
institution investor. Although no significant effect of identity of largest shareholders is 
found in the AR (1) regressions for both individual ownership and institutional ownership, 
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we still find their significant effect in the regression without AR (1) term. A significantly 
negative coefficient of 𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑀𝐴𝑋 means that if an individual shareholder owns most 
shares in the firm, it may decrease the firm value. Significant positive coefficient 
of  𝐼𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝑋  and (𝐼𝑁𝐷 ∗ 𝐼𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝑋)  supports our hypothesis: corporate value will be 
higher if the largest owner is an institutional investor. This result is consistent with 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), who also find that shareholder value creation will be 
higher if the largest owner is financial institution. In an institutional-owned company, the 
management team is efficiently monitored by institutional investors who have long-term 
horizon and rational investment behavior, thus this kind of firm has advantage over the 
firm that is mainly individual-owned.  
The regression using the change in value, rather than the level value, provides us more 
details on how a change in ownership relates to a change in firm value. We introduce 
another dummy variable IO_POS, indicating whether institutional ownership change is 
positive (dummy value equals 1). Table 9 shows that if institutional investors acquire 
more shares at this quarter, it is positively related to a change in firm value. The result 
seems to be different from the test results for the level of institutional ownership. Under 
the level of ownership regression, we assume that other variables affecting firm value do 
not change, thus, whether firm value increase or not depends on how shareholders change 
their ownership. The change in firm value moves along the line in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
However, when we use the change of ownership by calculating the difference between 
two quarters, the assumption that other variables affecting firm value do not change is not 
appropriate. The change of ownership is not affecting firm value along the line in Figure 
1 and Figure 2, instead, it actually shifts the line. Table 9 supports this explanation 
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because we find that the change of institutional ownership (∆𝐼𝑂) does not really affect 
firm value, what matters here is the fact that whether institutional shareholders acquires 
more shares of the firm, denoted by IO_POS, which is significant positive. The positive 
coefficient of this dummy variable suggests that the change of ownership affects firm 
value by shifting the line up and down because the intercept has changed (𝛽0 + 𝐼𝑂_𝑃𝑂𝑆). 
Assuming that institutional shareholding and firm value reaches equilibrium at some 
point and time, the reasons that institutional shareholders are willing to break this 
equilibrium may be as follows: their expectation of firm performance will increase in the 
future and thus they take actions to buy more shares in order to get more benefit from the 
expected increase in value. Although we are not sure about the causal relationship 
between the change in institutional ownership and change in firm value, one thing worth 
noting is that institutional shareholders care about the indirectly invested firm and they 





This study is primarily motivated by the relatively few studies regarding the relationship 
of both institutional ownership and individual ownership to firm performance. We find 
that institutional ownership first decreases firm value and then increases firm value after 
it reaches a certain threshold in both samples of direct ownership and indirect ownership. 
This suggests that while institutional shareholders can make a positive contribution by 
effectively monitoring, they can still create a new type of agency problem by pursuing 
their own interests. We find that individual ownership has a concave effect on corporate 
performance only in the sample of direct ownership. However, no significant relationship 
between individual ownership and corporate value can be found in the sample of indirect 
ownership. This may indicate that direct individual ownership has the problem of 
endogeneity.  
When we include both institutional ownership and unexpected individual ownership in 
the model, we find that the role institutional ownership plays in the corporation is 
counteracted when individuals hold unexpectedly high levels of ownership. We also find 
that if institutional shareholders acquire more shares between time (T-1) and time T, the 
change in firm value during this period is positive. We interpret this result by considering 
the willingness that institutional shareholders break the ownership structure equilibrium: 
they might have expected that the firm performance would increase in the future and thus 
purchase more shares in the expectation of future capital gains. But we cannot assure the 
increase in institutional ownership improve corporate performance. 
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Our paper provides evidence that the classification of the largest shareholder is also 
important in influencing firm performance. Firm value is lower if the company is 
majority owned by individuals (or families). But firm value creation is higher if the 
largest shareholder is an institutional investor and it also strengthens the positive effect of 
individual ownership imposed on firm value when individual ownership is at a low level. 
One limitation in this paper is the possible sample bias in the panel data of indirect 
ownership. We create the balanced panel data by choosing the firms that show up from 
March 2004 to June 2010. These firms may perform better than other firms so that they 
survive over this long period. In addition, to improve the study in ownership structure and 
corporate performance in the future, it is suggested that different measures of firm 
performance and specific firm risk should be applied. Further studies also could be done 
to identify the types of institutional investors, banks, mutual funds, pension funds, 
insurance company or government. Their investment horizons and investment goals are 









Figure I Tobin’s Q as a function of individual ownership 
Individual ownership as a fraction of total shares owned by individual shareholders for the sample 
of 3901 firms in June 2003 and 3724 firms in June 2005 
 
 
Figure II Tobin’s Q as a function of institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership as a fraction of total shares owned by institutional shareholders for the 





























Figure III Tobin’s Q as a function of unexpected individual ownership and institutional 
ownership in 2003 
Unexpected individual ownership (RES_IND) and institutional ownership (IO) versus Tobin’s Q 
for a sample of 3901 firms in June 2003 
 
 
Figure IV Tobin’s Q as a function of unexpected individual ownership and institutional 
ownership in 2005 
Unexpected individual ownership (RES_IND) and institutional ownership (IO) versus Tobin’s Q 





Table 1 Number of firms  
Number of firms in each quarter as we merge OSIRIS with CRSP, then with COMPUSTAT. 
Column ―OSIRS‖ shows total number of firms downloaded from OSIRIS. Column ―OSIRIS-
CRSP‖ shows the number of firms after we merge OSIRIS with CRSP. Column ―OSIRIS-CRSP-
COM‖ shows the number of firms after we merge OSIRIS-CRSP with COMPUSTAT. Firms 
with missing valid value in COMPUSTAT have been deleted from the sample. 
Quarter OSIRIS OSIRIS-CRSP OSIRIS-CRSP-COM 
2004Q1 4215 3484 2840 
2004Q2 4154 3443 2807 
2004Q3 4157 3424 2824 
2004Q4 4114 3369 2778 
2005Q1 4124 3378 2791 
2005Q2 4095 3348 2748 
2005Q3 4157 3424 2848 
2005Q4 5471 4562 3416 
2006Q1 5507 4577 3481 
2006Q2 5317 4554 3481 
2006Q3 4893 3953 3309 
2006Q4 4555 3739 3097 
2007Q1 3897 3166 2629 
2007Q2 3967 3223 2673 
2007Q3 5564 4639 3907 
2007Q4 5438 4522 3866 
2008Q1 5466 4564 3882 
2008Q2 5522 4553 3875 
2008Q3 5448 4483 3883 
2008Q4 5458 4456 3766 
2009Q1 5422 4356 3692 
2009Q2 5386 4262 3628 
2009Q3 5378 4183 3556 
2009Q4 5345 4131 3514 
2010Q1 5146 4068 3485 







Table 2 Data description 
Average number and ownership of each shareholder type by quarter. For each shareholder type, 
we calculate its average number by using Ni as the number of corresponding shareholders 
invested in firm i and n as total number of firms in that quarter, where (N1 + N2 + ⋯ + Nn )/n, 
measures the aggregate cross-sectional number of shareholders in a quarter. Average ownership 
per shareholder of each type is calculated by using percentage Oi  as corresponding ownership of 
shareholder i and m as total number of corresponding shareholders in that quarter, where (O1 +
O2 + ⋯ + Om )/m, measures the average shareholding owned by each shareholder. 
Quarter 













2004Q1 8.49 1 11.47 1 12.52 0 
2004Q2 8.58 1 11.93 1 20.28 0 
2004Q3 8.48 1 11.16 1 17.9 0 
2004Q4 8.42 1 11.1 1 18.22 0 
2005Q1 8.5 1 11.02 1 17.48 0 
2005Q2 8.7 1 11.05 1 19.84 0 
2005Q3 8.46 1 10.91 1 14.82 0 
2005Q4 2.68 7 10.69 1 2.61 2 
2006Q1 2.66 7 10.6 1 2.74 2 
2006Q2 1.29 173 10.76 1 1.58 2 
2006Q3 1.24 16 11.34 1 1.77 2 
2006Q4 1.14 16 11.53 1 1.67 2 
2007Q1 1.07 16 11.27 1 1.42 2 
2007Q2 0.95 19 11.34 1 1.13 3 
2007Q3 1.21 42 11.07 1 1.19 2 
2007Q4 1.24 42 11.31 1 1.39 2 
2008Q1 1.28 42 10.98 1 1.24 2 
2008Q2 1.28 42 11.93 1 1.31 2 
2008Q3 1.27 43 12.89 1 1.47 2 
2008Q4 1.27 42 12.67 1 1.45 2 
2009Q1 1.3 42 12.47 1 1.49 2 
2009Q2 1.37 42 12.46 1 1.7 2 
2009Q3 1.36 42 12.03 1 1.74 2 
2009Q4 1.19 42 11.54 1 1.22 2 
2010Q1 1.26 42 11.35 1 1.3 2 
2010Q2 1.26 42 11.61 1 1.21 2 
 
                                               
3 The number of institutional shareholders and the number of company shareholders has sharply increases 
as more information sources are used by BvDEP from 2005. Therefore, BvDEP report more shareholders 





 Institutional ownership and individual ownership 
Median, minimum and maximum value for both institutional ownership and individual ownership 
from March 2004 and June 2010. 




Median Min Max 
 
Median Min Max 
2004Q1 6.93 4.00 90.09 
 
5.92 1.00 98.98 
2004Q2 7.00 4.00 90.09 
 
6.32 1.00 100.00 
2004Q3 7.06 4.00 98.66 
 
5.75 1.00 98.74 
2004Q4 6.86 4.00 90.09 
 
5.75 1.00 98.74 
2005Q1 7.00 4.00 90.65 
 
5.64 1.00 97.21 
2005Q2 6.72 4.01 90.09 
 
5.60 1.00 97.21 
2005Q3 6.98 1.00 90.65 
 
5.50 1.00 97.21 
2005Q4 1.28 0.30 90.65 
 
5.40 0.22 97.21 
2006Q1 1.27 0.30 90.65 
 
5.28 0.22 97.21 
2006Q2 0.46 0.10 90.65 
 
5.33 0.30 100.00 
2006Q3 0.42 0.10 90.65 
 
5.90 0.12 99.6 
2006Q4 0.39 0.10 99.06 
 
5.93 0.12 99.6 
2007Q1 0.36 0.10 99.06 
 
5.94 0.11 99.60 
2007Q2 0.34 0.10 97.00 
 
5.77 0.11 96.02 
2007Q3 0.45 0.10 97.00 
 
5.20 0.11 96.02 
2007Q4 0.38 0.10 96.28 
 
5.41 0.11 97.65 
2008Q1 0.39 0.10 96. 28 
 
5.30 0.11 96.02 
2008Q2 0.46 0.03 99.13 
 
6.01 0.10 96.69 
2008Q3 0.45 0.03 98.00 
 
6.74 0.10 96.17 
2008Q4 0.43 0.01 98.00 
 
6.36 0.10 96.17 
2009Q1 0.46 0.01 98.00 
 
7.04 0.10 96.17 
2009Q2 0.50 0.10 99.34 
 
7.60 0.10 96.17 
2009Q3 0.50 0.10 93.49 
 
7.69 0.10 96.17 
2009Q4 0.44 0.10 95.59 
 
6.79 0.10 96.17 
2010Q1 0.43 0.10 98.00 
 
6.45 0.10 96.17 
2010Q2 0.43 0.10 97.33 
 




                                               




Table 4 Regression of Tobin’s Q on equity ownership in direct ownership sample 
Regression of Tobin Q on equity ownership for 3901 firms in June 2003 and 3742 firms in June 
2005 (t-statistics in parentheses). IND is individual ownership owned by total individual 
shareholders within one company; IO is institutional ownership owned by total institutional 
shareholders within one company; LEV is the leverage ratio; Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets; ROA is return on asset. 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 0.221*** 0.299*** 0.174*** 0.249*** 
 




































LEV 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 
(16.07) (14.31) (14.80) (13.62) 
SIZE 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.058*** 
 
(21.10) (24.90) (22.05) (24.34) 
ROA -0.477*** -0.486*** -0.492*** -0.494*** 
 
(-13.24) (-13.75) (-10.93) (-11.08) 
Adj. R
2 0.211 0.239 0.203 0.218 
Inflection point 38% 53% 36% 50% 














Table 5 Unexpected individual ownership 
Regression of Tobin Q on equity ownership for 3901 firms in June 2003 and 3742 firms in June 
2005 (t-statistics in parentheses). IO is institutional ownership owned by total institutional 
shareholders within one company; RES_IND is the residual taken from the regression of 
individual ownership on institutional ownership; LEV is the leverage ratio; Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets; ROA is return on asset. 
















































































 Regression of Tobin’s Q on individual ownership in indirect ownership sample 
Regression of Tobin Q on indirect individual ownership for subsamples of yearly data from 2004 
to 2010 and a pooled data using all firm-quarterly observations. IND is individual ownership 
owned by total individual shareholders within one company; LEV is the leverage ratio; Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets; ROA is return on asset. AR term is included in every regression, 
except for year 2010, to take into account the autocorrelation problem arising from time series 
data. 
Variable Pooled 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 0.253*** 0.076*** -0.43*** -0.63*** 0.273*** 0.746*** 0.639*** 0.780*** 
 
(23.59) (4.90) (-27.91) (-26.65) (34.61) (32.49) (22.68) (117.42) 
IND 0.002 -0.013** 0.068*** -0.037** -0.024** 0.095*** 0.084*** 0.383*** 
 
(0.75) (-1.65) (16.88) (-5.15) (-13.67) (3.19) (4.12) (55.97) 
(IND)
2 -0.000 0.023*** -0.05*** 0.084*** 0.023*** -0.155** -0.029 -0.647** 
 
(-0.04) (2.61) (-4.35) (5.77) (6.39) (-2.56) (-0.44) (-5.22) 
LEV 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.016*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 
 
(42.49) (73.85) (4.58) (7.100) (76.59) (13.69) (15.57) (7.89) 
SIZE 0.041*** 0.069*** 0.154*** 0.183*** 0.033*** -0.035** -0.02*** -0.04*** 
 
(24.45) (26.36) (60.51) (48.47) (27.16) (-9.79) (-4.49) (-45.43) 
ROA -0.21*** 0.161*** -0.48*** -0.372** -0.167** -0.281** -0.518** -0.237** 
 
(-33.36) (-13.36) (-36.12) (-30.42) (-60.46) (-31.59) (-41.12) (-73.36) 
AR(1) 0.882*** 0.200*** 0.107*** 0.312*** 0.014*** 0.295*** 0.272*** 
 
 
(248.72) (16.87) (21.78) (27.82) (6.44) (15.99) (27.22) 
 Auto(2)          
p-value 
0.366 0.526 0.498 0.374 0.296 0.741 0.599 
 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2 0.996 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
N 18876 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 1452 
*0.1 significant level; **0.05 significant level; ***0.01 significant level. 
Firm fixed effect is tested for every regression to make sure it is necessary to apply panel data 
approach. If the test confirms the existence of firm specific effect, then we mark ―Yes‖. We also 
report the p-value of second-order residual autocorrelation. 
                                               
5 We tested effect of number of firms by considering the concentration ratio of ownership, but the result is 
not significant and we do not report it in the table. 
6 The high R2 results from the panel data firm-fixed effect approach, which adds a dummy variable for each 
firm and creates 726 dummy variables in the model. In Introduction Econometrics: a Modern Approach, 
Jeffrey Wooldridge also confirms that panel data firm-fixed effect approach may cause high R2. 
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Table 7 Regression of Tobin’s Q on institutional ownership in indirect ownership sample 
Regression of Tobin Q on indirect institutional ownership for subsamples of yearly data from 
2004 to 2010 and a pooled data using all firm-quarterly observations. IO is institutional 
ownership owned by total institutional shareholders within one company; LEV is the leverage 
ratio; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA is return on asset. AR term is included in 
every regression, except for year 2010, to take into account the autocorrelation problem arising 
from time series data. 
Variable Pooled 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 0.253*** 0.085*** -0.416** -0.623** 0.249*** 0.754*** 0.594*** 0.771*** 
 
(23.61) (5.22) (-17.41) (-28.84) (25.64) (34.31) (22.25) (70.51) 
IO -0.003** -0.025** -0.025** 0.003*** -0.023** 0.000 -0.000 -0.038** 
 
(-1.78) (-3.60) (-12.75) (4.03) (-47.76) (0.05) (-0.05) (-11.30) 
(IO)
2 0.003*** 0.058*** 0.028*** -0.001** 0.026*** -0.009 0.042*** 0.055*** 
 
(1.74) (2.50) (8.63) (-3.36) (53.50) (-1.18) (5.10) (22.08) 
LEV 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.016*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(42.61) (71.074) (5.215) (7.27) (101.92) (14.14) (15.54) (7.84) 
SIZE 0.041*** 0.068*** 0.152*** 0.182*** 0.037*** -0.036** -0.014** -0.04*** 
 
(24.57) (24.85) (38.61) (52.44) (23.77) (-10.50) (-3.36) (-22.76) 
ROA -0.208*** -0.16*** -0.45*** -0.37*** -0.17*** -0.28*** -0.49*** 0.242*** 
 
(-33.37) (-13.34) (-30.87) (-33.08) (-71.74) (-30.52) (-37.99) (-66.96) 
AR(1) 0.882*** 0.199*** 0.120*** 0.309*** 0.014*** 0.295*** 0.253*** 
 
 
(248.75) (16.73) (17.01) (32.27) (6.42) (16.05) (23.30) 
 Auto(2)          
p-value 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Inflection 
point 
49% 13% 44% / 45% / / 34% 
N 
18876 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 1452 
*0.1 significant level; **0.05 significant level; ***0.01 significant level. 
Firm fixed effect is tested for every regression to make sure it is necessary to apply panel data 
approach. If the test confirms the existence of firm specific effect, then we mark ―Yes‖. We also 
report the p-value of second-order residual autocorrelation. 
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Table 8 Unexpected individual ownership and identity of the largest shareholder 
Regression of Tobin Q on equity and other variables. RES_IND is the dummy variable which 
takes 1 if unexpected individual ownership is larger than 0 and vice versa; IND_MAX is the 
dummy variable which takes 1 if the largest shareholder is individual; IO_MAX is the dummy 
variable which takes 1 if the largest shareholder is institutional. LEV is the leverage ratio; Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA is return on asset. AR term is included in every 



































































      
 
(-0.40) 
      IO*RES_IND(dummy) 0.009*** 
      
 
(3.06) 
      [IO*RES_IND(dummy)]2 -0.012*** 
      
 
(-3.36) 














































   Auto(2) p-value 0.346 
 
0.389 0.390 
   











*0.1 significant level; **0.05 significant level; ***0.01 significant level. 
Firm fixed effect is tested for every regression to make sure it is necessary to apply panel data 
approach. If the test confirms the existence of firm specific effect, then we mark ―Yes‖. We also 
report the p-value of second-order residual autocorrelation. 
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Table 9 Relationship between change in Tobin’s Q and change in institutional ownership 
Regression of change in Tobin Q on change in institutional ownership. ∆Tobin Q is calculated as 
difference between Tobin Q at time T and Tobin Q at time (T-1); ∆IO is calculated as difference 
between IO at time T and IO at time (T-1); IO_POS is dummy variable which takes 1 if the 
change in institutional equity is larger than 0 and vice versa; LEV is the leverage ratio; Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets; ROA is return on asset. AR term is included in regression. 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics 
C -0.009** (-2.47) 
∆IO 0.000 (0.03) 
IO_POS(dummy) 0.0004** (1.77) 
∆IO*IO_POS(dummy) 0.004 (1.56) 
LEV 0.001*** (10.37) 
SIZE 0.001** (2.41) 
ROA -0.387*** (-53.66) 
AR(1) -0.074*** (-8.55) 
Auto(2) p-value 0.297 
Firm Effect Yes 
Adj. R
2 0.27 
* 0.1 significant level; ** 0.05 significant level; *** 0.01 significant level. 
Firm fixed effect is tested to make sure it is necessary to apply panel data approach. If the test 
confirms the existence of firm specific effect, then we mark ―Yes‖. We also report the p-value of 
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